30 Teams in 30 Days: Chicago Cubs

2011 Record: 71-91, 5th place NL Central
Major Acquisitions: Theo Epstein, SP Chris Volstad, 1B Anthony Rizzo, SP Paul Maholm, RP Kerry Wood, OF Reed Johnson, 3B Ian Stewart, SP Travis Wood, RF David Dejesus
Major Losses: RP Chris Carpenter, SP Carlos Zambrano, RP Andrew Cashner, OF Tyler Colvin, RP Sean Marshall

The Cubs were uncompetitive, as has been the norm of late for this illustrious organization.  Despite a high payroll, the Cubs have been unable to amass wins on the field, mostly because their big money is locked up in players like Alfonso Soriano, Carlos Zambrano, and Ryan Dempster; so they brought in Theo Epstein to help change the losing culture that's taken over the organization of late.  The Cubs were pretty average across the board offensively aside from steals, where their 69 steals in 2011 was the third least in baseball (Detroit was lowest at 49).  As far as pitching is concerned, the Cubs' staff easily led the league in giving out the most bases on balls, and the entire team totaled a 4.34 ERA, ranking them 25th in MLB.

Projected Lineup:
RF David Dejesus
SS Starlin Castro
CF Marlon Byrd
1B Bryan LaHair
LF Alfonso Soriano
C Geovany Soto
2B Darwin Barney
3B Ian Stewart

David Dejesus came pretty cheaply at 2 years, $10 million, and if he can return to his days of posting a .780 to .800 OPS with good defense, the Cubs got an absolute steal here, and a great leadoff hitter.  He went to Oakland where offense goes to die, and predictably his OPS plummeted.  His SLG was near a career-low and his BABIP of .276 was the lowest of his career, where he averages a .316 BABIP for his career.  Look for a bounce-back from him this year, and for him to be a tradeable asset in 2013.  Starlin Castro has the skills to be a star at shortstop and already has two insanely consistent seasons under his belt.  Both seasons he hit .300 and OPS'ed about .750, along with good speed on the basepaths.  Last year he stole 22 bases in 31 attempts, which isn't a great rate, but he's their best stolen base threat, so look for him to possibly increase that number closer to 30 this year.

Marlon Byrd is probably the best option to hit #3 which begins to show the problems with this lineup.  He'll post an OPS around .750, possibly towards .800, but has little power and only decent speed.  He's a more valuable quantity because he plays center field, but as a #3 hitter, he doesn't fit the mold. Like Castro, he doesn't walk much, so there could be a lot of 1-2-3 innings for pitchers facing the top of the Cubs' lineup.  Bryan LaHair has been handed the clean-up spot in the lineup for some reason, although he's proven absolutely nothing except that he can hit for power in AAA at age 29.  Generally these players don't pan out in MLB, but I suppose the Cubs have no better options, as Anthony Rizzo clearly isn't MLB-ready yet either.  LaHair has extreme power, slugging 38 HRs in 523 plate appearances in AAA last year, and projects as a decent bat by every projection system.  A .270/.340/.440 line or something similar seems to be the general guess at his MLB production over a full season, but again, he's such a question mark that even that is questionable.  Alfonso Soriano is a shell of his former self, as while he maintains 20+ HR power, his average has settled in around the .240 to .250 range and his plate discipline continues to falter, drawing a walk about one of every 20 plate appearances now, whereas even in 2010 he drew a walk about every 12-13 plate appearances.  He can still hit for power and drive in runs, but he'll leave runners stranded just as often, and of course he's still an adventure in the field.

Geovany Soto looked to be one of the premier young players in baseball in 2008 when he hit 23 HRs with an OPS over .850 as a rookie.  Since then, he's just shown to be an inconsistent hitter.  In 2009 and 2011, he posted OPS figures below .750 while in 2010, he just missed out on a .900 OPS in 105 games.  Soto still has 20 HR power, but he's realistically a .240 hitter that strikes out too often while showing that power.  He's basically a slightly more disciplined version of Alfonso Soriano at this point while hitting, so nothing special, but at least he isn't making $18 million to do that.  Darwin Barney is a tiny second baseman with no power at all, but is great on defense and can hit around .280, so he's an okay utility infielder or starter if the rest of the infield is above average.  Unfortunately that's not the case for the Cubs, as rounding out the lineup is 3B Ian Stewart, who posted a sub-.500 OPS over 146 plate appearances before finally being demoted by the Rockies and traded to the Cubs.  Stewart does draw a fair amount of walks and has 20-25 HR power over a full season, but his average tops out at about .250 and he's largely ineffective against left-handed pitchers.  As a member of a platoon at 3rd base, Ian Stewart could post an .800 OPS in a good year and be a pretty valuable 3rd baseman.  If he starts against left-handers as well though, his value is lessened.  He's still a decent bet to rebound and could be a fine starting 3rd baseman for now.

One bench/minor league player to watch: OF Brett Jackson.  The Cubs' top prospect, he's flown through the minors and dominated in his 215 plate appearances in AAA last year.  He's got legitimate 20/20 potential and the Cubs would be well served to move Marlon Byrd or Alfonso Soriano and get him in the lineup sooner rather than later.  If he comes up early during the season or even wins a starting spot out of Spring Training, he could be in talks for NL Rookie of the Year.  Anthony Rizzo is the other minor leaguer to watch, as he was acquired from the Padres.  Theo Epstein drafted him with the Red Sox, traded him to the Padres, and then reacquired him with the Cubs, so he clearly has an affinity for him.  Rizzo will jump in at first base quickly if LaHair proves to be a Quadruple A player.

Starting Rotation:
SP Ryan Dempster
SP Matt Garza
SP Paul Maholm
SP Randy Wells
SP Travis Wood

The Cubs don't have a true #1 pitcher, which is a serious issue, but Dempster and Garza are both proven, solid commodities.  Dempster posted a 4.80 ERA but don't let that deceive you, as his K/9, BB/9 and HR/9 rates were almost exactly the same as his 2010 season where he posted a 3.85 ERA.  His 2011 FIP of 3.95 was actually lower than his 2010 3.99 FIP, suggesting that Dempster's .324 BABIP was more unlucky than a sign of his decline as a pitcher.  Additionally, Fangraphs listed the Cubs as the worst team defense in MLB, so there's even more reason to assume he'll return to his previous expectations.  His performance is very similar to Mark Buehrle in that you can expect 200 innings every year, and for him to post an ERA in the high 3's or low 4's.  The upside for Dempster over Buehrle is that Dempster can be counted on for nearly a strikeout per inning, as he's topped 170 strikeouts in each of the past 4 seasons.  Matt Garza is the best pitcher on the staff, but Dempster's longevity with the team will have him listed as the #1 in all likelihood.  Garza dominated the National League after coming over from the Tampa Bay Rays.  His groundball rate increased 10% to 47%, he struck out 47 more batters in 6 less innings than his 2010 season, allowed 14 HRs in 2011 (28 HRs allowed in 2010), and posted career lows in ERA (3.32), FIP (2.95) and xFIP (3.19). Garza's 5 WAR season put him with the top 15-20 pitchers in baseball for his performance last year, and he certainly increased his value to the Cubs should they wish to extend him past his final arbitration year next year.  His FIP is lower than his ERA because while he posted .270ish BABIPs from 2008-2010 in Tampa Bay thanks to their great defense, the poor defense of Chicago failed him.

The rest of the Cubs' rotation is filled by non-descript starters that likely won't provide any great performance, but won't be horrible either.  Paul Maholm is a groundball pitcher who relies greatly on his defense, so he may be in some serious trouble coming to Chicago.  Maholm's 3.66 ERA and 3.78 FIP last year which were career lows.  He did strand a lot of batters on base last year at 72% (MLB average is 70%) and his BABIP was a career low .286, so Maholm's ERA should rise to the low 4's, but he'll be a decent 3rd starter.  Randy Wells is a fairly average pitcher with two above-average years and one very poor year in 2011.  Wells allowed a HR every 6 innings even as a pitcher with groundball tendencies, doesn't strike batters out, and still had a 5.11 FIP and 4.99 ERA with a BABIP of .275, far below the league average of about .300.  Wells is a filler, nothing more.  Wood is still young and has two partial MLB seasons under his belt, one where his BABIP was extremely low and he pitches to a 3.59 ERA and in 2011 his BABIP was .324 and he posted a 4.84 ERA.  Realistically, his ERA should settle in around his 2011 FIP of 4.06.  He's a pretty extreme flyball pitcher, so a move to Wrigley may help him quite a bit, getting out of Great American Ballpark, although he never struggled with surrendering HRs there.  Expect Wood to be an above average #5 starter, but for a contender he's no more than a #4 or #5 pitcher.

Bullpen:
CL Carlos Marmol
MR Kerry Wood
MR Jeff Samardzija
MR James Russell
MR Trever Miller
MR Andy Sonnanstine
LR Chris Volstad

Carlos Marmol is one of the most frustrating pitchers in baseball.  He strikes out 12 batters per 9 innings with regularity, and set the record for relievers with a 15.99 K/9 in 2010, but he also walks almost 6 batters per 9 innings to go along with it.  His ERA and FIP are completely unpredictable, as he's posted FIPs as low as 2.01 (2010) and FIPs as high as 4.06 (2009).  His slider is near unhittable, but he also rarely throws it for strikes, and his fastball isn't very effective to offset it.  He throws his slider nearly 60% of the time so it's a wonder he hasn't suffered more injuries, but in the meantime he's still a good reliever, albeit one that can blow 10 saves in a season for your team like he did in 2011.  Kerry Wood and Jeff Samardzija both have below-average control, but strike out plenty of batters and are quite effective.  Volstad is probably the least effective of the potential candidates for the Cubs' rotation, so I'm projecting him to be the spot starter and long reliever.

Five Fearless Predictions for 2012:
1. Matt Garza duplicates his 2011 season, while his ERA drops closer to 3, and the Cubs deal him to the Tigers for a deal involving Jacob Turner.
2. David Dejesus rebounds and posts a .290/.360/.420 season, scoring 80 runs.
3. Ian Stewart returns to his previous levels of production, posting a .240/.320/.460 line and 20 HRs at 3B.
4. Ryan Dempster's ERA drops at least a full run, and his peripherals (K/9, BB/9, HR/9) remain almost exactly the same.  Dempster is shopped around but decides to exercise his no-trade clause and remains in Chicago.
5. Anthony Rizzo joins the regular lineup by the All-Star Break and posts a .770 OPS with 10 HRs.


When your #1 offseason acquisition is a GM, your organization is in dire straits.  This team needs serious work, and like the Astros, are a few years from contending, but they have young players like Rizzo, Castro, Soto, Jackson to build around and marketable commodities in Matt Garza and Ryan Dempster they hope to deal this year.  The Cubs won't make any real noise this year, but I'd expect slight improvement from last season.

Team Finish: 74-88, 4th place NL Central

Upton, McCutchen, Bruce: Who's More Valuable?

News broke today that the Pittsburgh Pirates reached a 6-year extension with the cornerstone of their franchise, Andrew McCutchen, worth $51.5 million over 6 years with a club-option for a seventh season at $14.75 million.  There's no question that the Pirates were prudent in signing this deal and saved themselves tens of millions down the road by locking up their young star by paying him slightly more money up front.  The interesting thing about Andrew McCutchen's contract is that it confirms that a market has been set for young, elite outfielders with two years of service time.

2010: Justin Upton: 6 years, $51.25 million 

2011: Jay Bruce: 7 years, $64 million (6 years, $51 million with club-option for 7th year at $13 million)

2012: Andrew McCutchen: 7 years, $66.25 million (6 years, $51.5 million with club-option for 7th year at $14.75 million)

None of these players are centerpieces of teams that are consistent high spenders, so the importance of locking their young talent up earlier rather than later was crucial.  The similarity of the contracts is amazing though, and shows a market for the elite 25-year-old (or younger) outfielder has clearly been defined.  The contracts are so similar, and all of them were signed preceding a different MLB season, in addition to there being a clear progression in total money that the players could make on their respective contracts, so it's very easy to compare the three players' production and determine which team got the biggest bargain.  

We'll look at each players' production at the time of their extensions, and compare them to see whose production was most valuable.  The chart below shows the players' averages per 162 games played in their MLB career before they signed their respective extensions (WAR and UZR are cumulative, not 162-game averages):

The immediate thing that jumps out is McCutchen's total WAR production in comparison to the other two players. Him playing CF should give him an edge of about 1 win per season, but because he rated so poorly in the field, his value in the field is about equivalent to Jay Bruce's, an above average right fielder.  This does mean he has a marked advantage in value over Justin Upton, however, who is a pretty average right fielder.  Last season, McCutchen's playing center field made him worth a full 10 runs (or one win) more than Justin Upton, to put things in perspective, so McCutchen over the course of 3 seasons accrued about 30 more runs of value than Upton would for his team just by virtue of playing center field vs. right field. McCutchen also gave back some of that edge because he was rated as the worst fielder of the three, again, partially because he plays the most demanding position.  

Upton's case is interesting because in his first season of 44 games, he struggled mightily with a -0.8 WAR and .647 OPS.  However, the reasoning for this was that Upton was merely 21 years old at the time of his call up, and only played 71 games above A ball, none of which were in AAA.  He was a very raw, unprepared prospect, but an undeniable talent and the Diamondbacks rushed him to MLB which luckily didn't stunt his development.  Of the three, Upton showed the most growth as an MLB player prior to his contract.  Additionally, his BABIP was the highest of the three players, 

Jay Bruce was basically a slightly lesser version of Justin Upton across the board, except he displayed more power (both are two of the ten most powerful hitters in the league) in his statistics than Upton did.  Additionally, Bruce played more games than Upton in his first 3 seasons (357 games for Bruce vs. Upton's 289), and was more effective in his first MLB season, posting a 0.9 WAR across 108 games with a .767 OPS.  Bruce had more time in the minor leagues, however, which seems to be a major reason for his more instant production (Bruce played 99 games in AAA prior to his MLB callup in early 2008).  Bruce did excel in the field however, playing the fourth best right field in baseball from 2008-2010 according to UZR, and showing the best arm in right field of anyone in baseball, even besting Ichiro during that time period.  Bruce's defensive value was the biggest difference between him and Upton.

McCutchen profiles between Bruce and Upton as a hitter during their respective time periods by OPS, as he was more productive than Bruce but less productive than Upton (largely because of Upton's insane 2009 season, which we'll get to later).  McCutchen rates as a below average fielder, which honestly made him about as valuable in the field as Upton, an average right fielder, so Bruce holds an edge here too.  The big difference that accounted for McCutchen's 12.9 WAR over his first 3 seasons was that he produced consistently from day one.  He played 420 games over the past 3 seasons, far out-pacing Bruce and Upton prior to their contract extensions, and produced at least 3.5 WAR in each season.  His 2009 and 2010 seasons were marked by identical .286 AVGs and .365 OBPs to further demonstrate his consistency.  This is largely in part due to his playing parts of three seasons in AAA, honing his craft before reaching the MLB level.  His 2011 season was the most valuable of any of the three as far as their respective "contract years" are concerned, so now let's examine the year that ultimately helped these 3 players get their contract offers so early in their careers:

As we can see, Upton's 2009 season was tremendous, and garnered him a couple votes in MVP consideration.  He only had 3 steals prior to his 2009 season, so he worked on his hitting prior to his work on the basepaths, showing a development progression that was ideal.  Upton has since been a consistent 20-steal player, with potential for more if he moved out of the middle of the order.  Upton's 2009 season was marked by a .360 BABIP as you can see, but he also displayed a higher baseline BABIP (.340) than that of Bruce or McCutchen in his career up to that point.  He and McCutchen both posted solid line drive rates in all 3 seasons, while Jay Bruce's 2nd MLB season featured him struggling to hit line drives as his LD% dropped from 20% to 13% and his BABIP was a mere .221.  As we can see, offensively, Upton had the most effective season by wRC+, creating 40% more runs than the average MLB player.  Bruce and McCutchen were still very solid, and All-Star caliber, but can't compare to Upton's rate production, as his SLG was far higher and he hit .300.  

McCutchen did end up posting the highest WAR, meaning his "contract year" was the most valuable of the three.  He actually could be expected to improve a fair amount from his 2011 production.  While his walk rate rose to 13%, which is elite, his K% rose 5% from 13.6% in 2010 to 18.6% in 2011.  McCutchen moved to the #3 hole for the first time in his career, which likely contributed in part to his lower average and career-high in home runs and HR/FB%.  Now, McCutchen has to be more concerned about driving runs than getting on base, especially since the Pirates' offense apart from the top 3 hitters is pretty anemic.  McCutchen hit 41% of pitches he made contact with for flyballs, and hit less infield flies than ever before, which shows a concerted effort to hit the ball for power.  His HR/FB% of 12% complemented this rise in flyballs, but McCutchen would be more valuable as a pure hitter if he hit more like 2009 and 2010 than he did last year.  To the Pirates, however, he's a more valuable quantity as a 25-30 HR hitter that adds in 20 stolen bases, similar to Justin Upton's production.

All three players, given their current levels of production, profile as potential $15+ million per year players on the free agent market.  Fangraphs posts a value of each player's seasons by multiplying their WAR by the season's market rate "per win".  Last year, after adding up salaries and dividing it by WAR, every win a player produced in WAR was worth about $4.47 million if the player was a free agent.  So given this, McCutchen, Upton, and Bruce were all worth over $20 million in the season preceding their contract extension.  All three are easily worth the contracts they commanded, and the Reds and Pirates seemed to get the better contracts, as those club options for a 7th year are squarely in the middle of Jay Bruce and Andrew McCutchen's primes.  Upton will hit free agency a year earlier in his respective career, so the Diamondbacks missed an opportunity to lock him up at a below-market rate.  

Given all of the analysis above, McCutchen's deal with the Pirates seems to be the most valuable contract to any of the players' respective teams.  McCutchen is a consistent 5-WAR player if he improves/continues on last season, which is very likely, and as a center fielder his bat is more valuable than in right field, where there is a lot of depth right now (Nelson Cruz, Hunter Pence, Matt Holliday to name a few).  His production will outpace his true value in every season of his contract, and he's locked up for 7 seasons instead of 6.  While this assumes a lot of projectability, McCutchen's consistency makes his performance the easiest to predict going forward.  To analyze the other two, it's tough not to look at their production post-contract to differentiate between the very similar skillsets, especially their dynamic power.  Upton's 2011 was phenomenal and he really put everything together, lowering his strikeout rate by 7%, posting the highest isolated power (ISO) of his career at .240, and posting the highest contact rate of his career at 74.5%, making contact on 85% of swings at pitches in the strike zone.  Upton still does have his flaws, as he's a free-swinger and will always strike out 100+ times per season, but his improvement in this area vaults him over Bruce in my opinion.  This isn't to say Bruce isn't valuable, as his 2011 season compares very favorably with Upton's 2010 season, the first season following each player's respective extension was signed.  Bruce projects as a .280/.360/.500 player going forward that should produce approximately 5 wins per season.

Big names to watch this season are Mike Stanton and Jason Heyward, as they both would have the same career lengths following this season, so they're due for similar extensions if their teams would like to be proactive.  I fully expect Stanton to receive an extension similar in value or surpassing the value of these players' deals.  These contracts are more common than odd now, and these three small-market teams did a fantastic job locking their players up long-term and rewarding them early on for their elite production.